Cuban Missile Crisis

After World War II, the world divided into two camps. The USSR and USA — former allies — became adversaries in an ideological, political, and military confrontation known as the Cold War.

KEY MILESTONES OF ESCALATION

1945 — US is the only nuclear power (Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings)

1949 — USSR tests first atomic bomb. Nuclear arms race begins

1950–1953 — Korean War — first direct clash between blocs

1955 — Warsaw Pact created in response to NATO

1957 — USSR launches first satellite. Space race begins

1961 — Berlin Wall. Symbol of a divided world

By 1962, nuclear arsenals had reached devastating power: the US possessed ~27,000 warheads, USSR — ~3,300. But this very imbalance made deploying missiles in Cuba so attractive to Moscow.

The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was only forming. Both sides still believed in the possibility of "winning" a nuclear war.

January 1, 1959: Fidel Castro and his rebels entered Havana. Dictator Fulgencio Batista fled. The Cuban Revolution triumphed.

Initially, Castro was not a communist. But nationalization of American property (oil refineries, sugar plantations, casinos) and rapprochement with the USSR quickly turned Cuba into an enemy of the US.

ESCALATION OF CONFLICT

March 1960 — CIA begins preparing invasion (Operation Zapata)

January 1961 — US severs diplomatic relations with Cuba

April 17, 1961 — Bay of Pigs invasion (Playa Girón): 1,400 émigrés with CIA support land in Cuba. Complete failure in 3 days. 114 killed, 1,189 captured

February 1962 — US imposes complete trade embargo

November 1961 — Operation Mongoose: CIA authorized for sabotage and Castro elimination

Castro: "After Bay of Pigs it became clear: the question was not whether Americans would attack again, but when."

For Cuba, Soviet missiles were a shield against what it considered inevitable American invasion.

In May 1962, Nikita Khrushchev made the historic decision to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. This was the largest secret military operation in Soviet history.

The operation was codenamed "Anadyr" — after a river and city in Chukotka. The name was deliberately chosen: if American intelligence intercepted messages, they would think of troop transfers to the Far North, not the tropics.

SCALE OF THE OPERATION

Missile armament: — 36 R-12 (SS-4) medium-range missiles with 2,000 km range — 24 R-14 (SS-5) medium-range missiles with 4,500 km range (not delivered in time) — 162 nuclear warheads ranging from 200 kilotons to 1 megaton

Tactical nuclear weapons (US learned of these only in 1992!): — 80 FKR cruise missiles with nuclear warheads for coastal defense — 12 Luna tactical missiles with nuclear warheads (2 kilotons each) — 6 atomic bombs for Il-28 bombers

Aviation and navy: — 42 Il-28 bombers (capable of carrying nuclear bombs) — 4 submarines with nuclear torpedoes — MiG-21 fighters

Personnel: — 42,000 Soviet military personnel — Officially — "agricultural specialists" and "instructors"

THE TRANSFER

Operation began in July 1962. 85 ships made 180 voyages between USSR and Cuba. Security measures were unprecedented:

— Missiles transported under tarpaulins as "agricultural equipment" — Soldiers issued skis, felt boots and fur coats — supposedly for Arctic service — Ship captains opened sealed envelopes with routes only at sea — Forbidden to go on deck during daytime — Ships took different routes, avoiding American patrols

KHRUSHCHEV'S MOTIVES

Why did Khrushchev take such a risk? Historians identify several reasons:

1. Protecting Cuba. After Bay of Pigs failure, Khrushchev promised Castro protection. Missiles made invasion suicidal for US.

2. Strategic parity. US had overwhelming superiority: 17 warheads for every Soviet one. Missiles in Cuba (90 miles from Florida) partially compensated for the imbalance.

3. Response to Jupiters. In 1961, US deployed medium-range missiles in Turkey and Italy — near Soviet borders. Khrushchev wanted Americans "to feel what it's like to be in our shoes."

4. Domestic political prestige. After Berlin Crisis, Khrushchev needed a foreign policy victory.

Anastas Mikoyan, Presidium member, warned: "This is adventurism. If Americans discover missiles before they become operational, there will be catastrophe." His words proved prophetic.

By October 14, R-12 missiles were almost ready to launch. But that very day, an American U-2 photographed them.

October 14, 1962, Sunday. Clear sky over Cuba. Perfect conditions for aerial photography.

THE U-2 FLIGHT

At 7:30 AM, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Major Richard Heyser took off from Edwards Air Force Base in California. Route: across Gulf of Mexico, then over western Cuba — San Cristóbal and Sagua la Grande areas.

U-2 flew at 22 kilometers altitude — beyond reach of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles (or so they thought). In 6 minutes over Cuba, cameras took 928 photographs with resolution allowing identification of objects 60 cm in size.

PHOTO ANALYSIS

October 15, film arrived at National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington. Analysts under Dino Brugioni worked through the night.

By morning of October 16, they identified in the photos:

— Launch pads for R-12 (SS-4) medium-range ballistic missiles — Transporter-erector launchers in characteristic Soviet configuration — Missile assembly and storage areas — Personnel tents — Fuel trucks

Site layout exactly matched Soviet missile bases in USSR — US intelligence had their photos. No doubt: these were nuclear missiles.

"MR. PRESIDENT, SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA"

October 16, 8:45 AM. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy entered the President's bedroom in the White House. John Kennedy was still in bed, reading newspapers.

Bundy: "Mr. President, we have incontrovertible evidence that the Russians are installing offensive missiles in Cuba."

According to eyewitnesses, Kennedy went pale. He immediately summoned his brother Robert and ordered an emergency meeting.

EXCOMM FORMATION

At 11:45 AM, 14 people gathered in the White House Cabinet Room — the President's closest advisors. Thus was born the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm):

— Robert Kennedy (Attorney General, President's brother) — Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense) — Dean Rusk (Secretary of State) — McGeorge Bundy (National Security Advisor) — General Maxwell Taylor (Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff) — John McCone (CIA Director) — And other senior officials

Kennedy ordered all meetings secretly recorded. These tapes, declassified in 1997, became an invaluable source for historians.

FIRST REACTIONS

Most ExComm members demanded immediate military response.

General Curtis LeMay, Strategic Air Command chief: "This is the greatest bluff in history. They won't dare respond. We must strike now while missiles aren't operational."

Robert Kennedy objected: "This would be Pearl Harbor in reverse. My brother is not going to be the Tojo of the 1960s."

Kennedy paused: "We can't just attack a small country without warning. That's not the American way."

The world still knew nothing. For the next six days, the President maintained his normal schedule, attended campaign rallies, smiled for cameras — while secretly deciding the planet's fate.

For six days (October 16–22), ExComm secretly debated response options. The world still knew nothing.

OPTIONS CONSIDERED

1. AIR STRIKE ("surgical") For: Generals LeMay, Taylor — Destroy missiles before they become operational — Show US resolve Against: Robert Kennedy, McNamara — Impossible to destroy all missiles (some already operational) — Soviet personnel will die → war — "This would be Pearl Harbor. My brother won't be another Tojo"

2. FULL-SCALE INVASION For: military, part of CIA — Solve the "Cuban problem" once and for all Against: majority — Up to 18,000 American casualties in first days — Inevitable escalation with USSR

3. NAVAL BLOCKADE ("quarantine") For: Kennedy, McNamara, Dean Rusk — Buys time for diplomacy — Shifts escalation decision to Khrushchev — Legally: not "blockade" (act of war), but "quarantine" Against: military — "Weak response. Russians won't stop"

4. DIPLOMACY WITHOUT MILITARY MEASURES For: Adlai Stevenson (UN Ambassador) — Propose exchange: Cuba missiles for Turkey missiles — Avoid war at any cost Against: majority — "Munich appeasement." Shows weakness

On October 22, Kennedy made his decision: naval blockade.

October 22, 1962, Monday. At 7:00 PM Eastern Time, John Kennedy addressed the American nation in a live broadcast. This was one of the most important speeches in history.

ADDRESS TO THE NATION

100 million Americans — nearly half the country's population — turned on televisions and radios. Many already sensed something serious: all day limousines with officials had circulated around Washington, the Pentagon buzzed like a hive.

Kennedy began calmly, but his words struck like thunder:

"Good evening, my fellow citizens. The Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere."

KENNEDY'S SEVEN POINTS

The President announced the following measures:

1. Strict "quarantine" — naval blockade on offensive weapons shipments to Cuba (word "blockade" avoided — under international law it's an act of war)

2. Increased aerial surveillance of Cuba

3. Any nuclear attack from Cuba against any Western Hemisphere nation would be regarded as an attack by USSR on US, requiring full retaliatory response against Soviet Union

4. Reinforcement of Guantanamo base, evacuation of military families

5. Emergency session of Organization of American States

6. Emergency session of UN Security Council

7. Appeal to Khrushchev to "halt and change this threatening and reckless course"

Kennedy concluded: "Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindication of right... in a world where the strong are just and the weak secure."

MILITARY READINESS

Simultaneously with the address, US armed forces went to heightened alert:

DEFCON 3 — for all armed forces (first time since Cold War began) DEFCON 2 — for Strategic Air Command (next step — nuclear war)

What this meant in practice:

— B-52 bombers with nuclear bombs airborne, patrolling Soviet borders round-the-clock — Atlas and Titan intercontinental missiles brought to full readiness — Polaris missile submarines deployed for combat duty — 180 US Navy ships headed to quarantine line (500 miles from Cuba) — Strike force concentrated in Florida: 100,000 troops, 90 ships, 579 aircraft

WORLD REACTION

USSR: Khrushchev furious. "This is piracy! Imperialist diktat! US is pushing the world toward thermonuclear catastrophe." Soviet leader ordered ships to continue toward Cuba.

Cuba: Castro declared general mobilization. 270,000 Cubans took up arms. "Patria o muerte!" — "Homeland or death!"

Europe: Panic. In London, Paris, Bonn, people emptied stores, stockpiling food.

UN: Secretary-General U Thant called on both sides for restraint.

The world held its breath. Soviet ships headed toward the quarantine line. Collision seemed inevitable.

October 24, 1962, Wednesday, 10:00 AM Washington time. Naval blockade officially in effect. The world froze in anticipation.

CONFRONTATION AT SEA

Tense silence reigned at the Pentagon. On the huge screen in the "war room," ship positions displayed. Blue dots — 180 American ships on the quarantine line. Red dots — 30 Soviet vessels heading for Cuba.

Robert McNamara recalled: "It was like watching a slow-motion nightmare. Ships moving toward each other. Collision seemed inevitable."

Leading the Soviet convoy were two freighters — Gagarin and Komiles. According to intelligence, they might be carrying missile equipment. Behind them — submarines (Americans didn't yet know they carried nuclear torpedoes).

"THE OTHER FELLOW BLINKED"

10:25 AM. Suddenly red dots on the screen stopped. Gagarin and Komiles froze 500 miles from quarantine line. A minute passed. Two. Five.

Then ships began turning around. They were going back.

In the war room someone exhaled. Dean Rusk leaned toward McGeorge Bundy and quietly uttered the phrase that became famous: "We were eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked."

But celebration was premature. Ships turning back meant only one thing: USSR avoided direct naval confrontation. Missiles in Cuba remained. Moreover, preparation work continued around the clock. U-2 photos showed: in a few days all R-12s would be operational.

MARUCLA INCIDENT (October 25)

To demonstrate blockade seriousness, Americans decided to conduct a demonstration inspection. They chose the Marucla — a freighter under Lebanese flag, chartered by USSR.

Destroyers Joseph P. Kennedy and John R. Pierce stopped Marucla at dawn. Marines boarded. Inspection lasted two hours.

Result: cargo peaceful — sulfur, trucks, paper. Ship allowed through. This was the first and only inspection during the entire blockade. But the signal was sent: US is not bluffing.

DRAMATIC UN NEGOTIATIONS (October 25)

Drama played out in UN Security Council that the whole world watched.

Soviet representative Valerian Zorin denied missiles in Cuba: "This is American provocation! Fake photographs!"

US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson stood and unfolded huge U-2 photographs:

"I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over! Yes or no? Are there Soviet missiles in Cuba?"

Zorin paled, hesitated: "You will receive your answer in due time."

Stevenson: "I am prepared to present the evidence right now."

Millions of TV viewers saw photos of missile bases. Soviet denial crumbled to dust.

KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER (October 26)

Friday evening, an unusual letter arrived at White House from Moscow. Long, rambling, emotional — nothing like typical Soviet diplomatic correspondence.

Later it was learned: Khrushchev wrote it himself, at night, in extreme tension. Key passage:

"If you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it."

Proposal was simple:

— USSR withdraws missiles from Cuba — US gives public guarantees of non-invasion of Cuba

This was a breakthrough! Cautious relief in White House. Kennedy inclined to accept.

But morning of October 27 brought a second letter. And it changed everything.

October 27, 1962 — the most dangerous day in human history. Several incidents nearly triggered nuclear war.

SECOND KHRUSHCHEV LETTER (morning)

Unlike the first — official, harsh. New demand: US withdraws Jupiter missiles from Turkey. ExComm confused: who wrote the first letter?

U-2 SHOT DOWN (noon)

U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Major Rudolf Anderson shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missile over Cuba. Anderson killed — only US combat casualty in crisis.

Launch decision made by Soviet air defense commander in Cuba, Lieutenant General Stepan Grechko, without Moscow's authorization. Khrushchev was furious.

Under military plans, U-2 shootdown should have automatically triggered strike on Cuban air defenses. Kennedy cancelled automatic response.

SUBMARINE B-59 INCIDENT

American destroyers detected Soviet submarine B-59 and began dropping practice depth charges to force it to surface. B-59 carried a nuclear torpedo.

Commander Valentin Savitsky, believing war had already begun: "We'll destroy them! We'll die, but we'll sink them all!"

Launching nuclear torpedo required agreement of three officers. Two were in favor. But Vasily Arkhipov, flotilla deputy commander, refused. B-59 surfaced.

Arkhipov possibly saved the world.

U-2 OVER USSR

That same day, an American U-2 accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace over Chukotka. Soviet fighters scrambled to intercept. American F-102s with nuclear air-to-air missiles took off to protect it. U-2 escaped in time.

By evening of "Black Saturday," Kennedy understood: time running out. Military demanding strike. One more incident — war unavoidable.

SECRET MEETING

October 27, 7:45 PM. Robert Kennedy secretly arrived at Soviet Embassy on 16th Street in Washington. He was led to Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin's office.

Meeting occurred without witnesses. No records. What was discussed became known only decades later.

Robert Kennedy was tense, pale. He got straight to the point:

"Situation is critical. President under tremendous pressure. Military demanding strike on Cuba — tomorrow or day after. My brother opposes, but he can't resist forever. We need a way out."

THE PROPOSAL

Robert outlined terms:

1. USSR publicly announces missile withdrawal from Cuba 2. US publicly guarantees non-invasion of Cuba 3. US secretly withdraws Jupiter missiles from Turkey within 4–6 months 4. If Soviet Union ever reveals Turkey agreement — deal cancelled

"We cannot officially link these two issues," Robert explained. "Public won't understand. But President intends to withdraw missiles from Turkey. They're obsolete anyway."

Dobrynin asked: "How much time do we have?"

Robert Kennedy: "Very little. Military pushing. One more incident — and it's over."

Dobrynin immediately transmitted proposal to Moscow via encrypted telegram.

KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION

October 28, 9:00 AM Moscow time. Sunday. Khrushchev urgently convened CPSU Central Committee Presidium at his residence on Lenin Hills.

Discussion was brief. Khrushchev understood:

— Cuba missiles not yet fully operational — US ready for invasion — War means millions dead

"Comrades," Khrushchev said, "Americans are offering us what we wanted from the start: guarantee of Cuba's security. And removing their missiles from Turkey. Why do we need this catastrophe?"

Decision was unanimous: accept proposal.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT

Khrushchev feared that while letter traveled through diplomatic channels, something might happen. So he chose unusual method — public radio address.

At 5:00 PM Moscow time (9:00 AM Washington) Moscow Radio began broadcast:

"Dear Mr. President! I received your letter of October 27 with great satisfaction... The Soviet Government... has given a new order to dismantle the weapons you described as offensive, to crate and return them to the Soviet Union."

White House exhaled. Kennedy forbade any celebration: "We must not gloat. Khrushchev is having a hard enough time."

13 days of crisis ended.

CUBA'S REACTION

Fidel Castro learned of decision from radio news — he wasn't informed in advance. According to interpreter's recollections, he flew into rage:

"Son of a bitch! Bastard! He betrayed us!"

Castro was humiliated. Cuba — subject of negotiations — didn't participate in them. Its fate was decided by two superpowers behind closed doors.

Subsequently Khrushchev sent Anastas Mikoyan to Havana to calm Castro. Negotiations lasted three weeks. Eventually Castro resigned himself, but relations with Moscow were never the same.

The Cuban Missile Crisis changed the world. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev realized: they had stood at the edge of the abyss. Paradoxically, the most dangerous moment of the Cold War became the beginning of its de-escalation.

IMMEDIATE RESULTS

Missile withdrawal (November 1962): Soviet ships removed all 42 R-12 missiles from Cuba under American aircraft observation. By November 20, Il-28 bombers also left the island. US lifted blockade.

"Hotline" (June 20, 1963): Direct teletype connection established between Kremlin and White House. No more delays with diplomatic couriers during crisis. Line still operates (modernized — now fiber optic and satellite).

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (August 5, 1963): USSR, US, and UK signed treaty in Moscow banning nuclear explosions in atmosphere, space, and underwater. First major agreement of nuclear disarmament era.

Turkey missile withdrawal (April 1963): As Kennedy promised, Jupiter missiles withdrawn from Turkey. Officially — "as part of modernization plan." No one knew about secret agreement (except inner circle) until 1989.

LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES

Crisis launched process of international tension reduction:

1968 — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1972 — SALT I: first strategic arms limitation agreement 1979 — SALT II: further limitations 1987 — INF Treaty: elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) concept became foundation of strategic stability. Both sides understood: nuclear war cannot be won.

WHO WON?

Question historians still debate.

American version (1960s–1980s): Kennedy forced Khrushchev to back down. US won clear victory.

Soviet/Russian version: Mutual compromise achieved. Main goal — Cuba's protection — fulfilled. US gave non-invasion guarantees, removed missiles from Turkey.

Modern historical consensus: No winners. Both sides made concessions, both saved face. Real winner — humanity, which avoided nuclear war.

WHAT WE LEARNED AFTER DECLASSIFICATION

In 1990s–2000s, archives from both sides were partially opened. It emerged that situation was far more dangerous than leaders understood in 1962:

— Tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba (Luna missiles, nuclear torpedoes) were unknown to US

— Soviet commanders had authority to use tactical nuclear weapons in case of invasion without Moscow's authorization

— Submarine B-59 incident was far closer to catastrophe than believed

— U-2 over Chukotka could have triggered automatic response

Robert McNamara, speaking at 1992 Havana conference (Castro sitting nearby): "We came much closer to nuclear war than we thought. It wasn't a triumph of crisis management — we were just lucky."

PERSONAL FATES OF PARTICIPANTS

John Kennedy: Assassinated November 22, 1963 in Dallas. Lived just over a year after crisis. Crisis considered pinnacle of his presidency.

Nikita Khrushchev: Removed October 1964. Officially for "voluntarism." Cuban crisis and retreat were among factors in his fall. Died in disgrace in 1971.

Fidel Castro: Remained in power until 2008 — longer than all other participants. Cuba never received formal peace treaty with US. Sanctions (embargo) continue to this day.

Vasily Arkhipov: The man who possibly saved the world remained virtually unknown. He continued service, rose to vice admiral. His role in crisis became known only in 2002 — four years after his death.

LESSONS OF THE CRISIS

Cuban Missile Crisis taught the world several important lessons:

1. Direct communication is critical. "Hotline" appeared because in October 1962 leaders lost hours exchanging messages.

2. Escalation can spiral out of control. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted war. But local incidents (downed U-2, submarine) could have triggered it.

3. Personal diplomacy works. Secret R. Kennedy–Dobrynin channel enabled compromise impossible through official channels.

4. Nuclear war cannot be won. Both leaders understood this. This understanding formed basis for all subsequent détente policy.

As Kennedy said after crisis: "In nuclear war there will be no winners — only survivors."